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Reviews / Historia Mathematica 33 (2006) 359–376 367a year, at Christmas, Easter, and Wakegoose. Lewin doesn’t tell us when Wakegoose was.1 A lump sum was paid on
a member’s death, depending on how long he had been a member, growing from just over a pound after one year to
£44 after 22 years.
The administrators of such schemes soon realized that the viability of their products depended on a good under-
standing of life tables, and mathematicians again stepped forward. The names best known among actuaries seem to be
John Graunt and Sir William Petty, with supporting roles played by people like Christian Huygens, Colin Maclaurin,
and Leonhard Euler. By the close of Lewin’s book around 1800, actuarial science is almost grown up and clearly
resembles today’s profession.
Overall, Lewin has written a good book on the history of pensions and insurance. It is written for an audi-
ence of actuaries, and has enjoyed a number of glowing reviews in the actuarial literature. It is generally well
written and is pleasant to read. Lewin is not a historian, nor a mathematician, and not a historian of mathe-
matics. His book is not a work of historical scholarship, and we should not judge it as such. Nor is he like
a veteran of some Victorian war, writing his reminiscences. He is a retired actuary, well liked and highly re-
spected in his field. To historians of mathematics he is like a “fellow of another college,” writing a popular his-
tory of one of our sister professions. He has given us copious references and lots of loose ends. His story of
early modern mercantile mathematics is particularly interesting. It reminds us that mathematics is inspired and
nourished by business, as well as by its more traditional sponsors in science, engineering, astronomy, and the
military. We should hope that someone uses his work as a starting point for a history of this largely neglected sub-
ject.
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During his lifetime, Christiaan Huygens was widely recognized as one of the “lions” of the “Republic of the
Sciences.” As has often been pointed out, however, he displayed few of the flamboyant traits and/or universalist
tendencies that were so characteristic of many of his fellow “greats.” Differently from his sometime rival Newton,
Huygens showed little interest in natural philosophy, or in any form of speculation for that matter. His interests were
almost uniquely limited to mathematics itself and those parts of the sciences that were directly amenable to mathe-
matical treatment. Even in his mathematical work, in sharp contrast to Descartes, Huygens was much more interested
in solving concrete problems with time-honored tools than creating new techniques. A diplomat by inclination, he
was more interested in working within the conventions of the sciences of the 17th century than in forging new ones.
1 Traditionally, Wakegoose was a banquet given by a printer for his employees around August 24 to mark the beginning of the season of working
by candlelight.
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Académie Royale. However, Huygens was much more than the prototype of a long line of very bright and diplomatic
“secrétaires perpétuels” of the Academy. Despite his conventionalism, Huygens came tantalizingly close to quite a
few discoveries by (near) contemporaries that ultimately would render the scientific and mathematical conventions of
his time obsolete. In mathematics, he came close to developing some of the techniques of the calculus. In mechanics,
his work on the pendulum foreshadowed the transition from the study of point masses to that of rigid bodies. Even
though Huygens was directly behind few breakthroughs in the sciences, his work was almost always on the cutting
edge.
The book under review studies yet another near-breakthrough, in this case in the field of optics. In 1690, Huygens
published his Traité de la lumière. It was bound with a treatise on the cause of gravity. Both treatises were written in
French rather than in Latin, an indication that Huygens considered their contents to be of a nonmathematical nature.
Indeed, the treatise on gravity was one of the few works of Huygens that do not contain any advanced mathematics at
all. Matters were different for the Traité, which in places is highly mathematical in nature. There are many indications,
however, that Huygens considered the book as an attempt to provide a mechanistic explanation of the nature of light.
As such, it was the first study to distinguish explicitly between the mathematical study of light rays and the study of
the physical properties of light—preceding Newton’s Opticks of 1704 by more than a decade. Huygens’ explanation
of the nature of light, however, ran completely counter to Newton’s and it would take at least a century before his
pioneering work was recognized.
Given his conventionalism, it seems odd that Huygens would be the one to take such a drastic step. Most of
Huygens’ earlier work in optics was mathematically sophisticated, but very much in line with the rectilinear light ray
paradigm established by Kepler and Galileo. This study by the Dutch historian of science F.J. Dijksterhuis (no relation
to the historian of science E.J. Dijksterhuis) tries to shed light on the issue by investigating the path that led Huygens
from his earlier studies to the writing of the Traité with the help of Huygens’ manuscripts. The treatise itself has been
extensively studied by many authors, but few have actually gone through the major effort of comparing its contents
to Huygens’ many unpublished writings on optics and trying to understand the nature of the book in the light of his
lifelong interest in optics and optical instruments. As Dijksterhuis’ work shows, although the manuscripts hold no
major surprises and few clues in that respect, in the end they do help us to better understand the place of the Traité in
Huygens’ work.
Dijksterhuis’ main point is that the Traité cannot really be understood without taking Huygens’ grappling with
the optical properties of so-called Iceland spar into consideration. For most optical media, the concept of a light ray
and the laws of reflection and refraction sufficed to describe all known optical behavior. Iceland spar is an exception
in that light rays passing through the crystal are refracted in two different directions. Whereas the direction of one
refracted ray is determined by the ordinary law of refraction, the direction of the other ray is not. In 1669, the Danish
mathematician Erasmus Bartholinus was the first to study this kind of “strange refraction” and to propose a law that
describes it. This work piqued Huygens’ interest and he soon found that Bartholinus’ law was fundamentally flawed.
Around the same time, Huygens was also exploring the idea of the propagation of light in the form of wave fronts.
As his Parisian acquaintance Ignace-Gaston Pardies had shown, this idea allowed an elegant derivation of the laws
of both reflection and refraction. Combining his two interests, Huygens set out to find a wave-theoretic explanation
of strange refraction and on August 6, 1679, he found it in the form of a geometrical construction. As Dijksterhuis
argues, however, there was a problem. Unlike the wave-theoretic explanation of the law of refraction, where the wave
theory can be separated from the enunciation of the law, Huygens’ construction could not be divorced from its wave-
theoretic origins. Rather than a description, the construction had become an explanation. Indeed, the construction
forced Huygens to think about the nature of light. Earlier on, Huygens had planned to publish a book in Latin that
would include all of his studies in dioptrics or what we now would call geometrical optics, but that would pay little
attention to the nature of light. Now the nature of light had to receive more attention. On and off during the next
decade, Huygens worked on a book in Latin that was to pay equal attention to geometrical and physical optics. At
very short notice, he opted for two separate books. The Traité became the one on the nature of light. In the end, the one
on dioptrics was never published. All in all, it would be fair to say that the Traité was almost an accidental publication.
By and large, Dijksterhuis’ story is convincing and I find little to argue with as far as his main arguments go. As
for the mathematical details, only the bare minimum is offered and it does not seem that more mathematics would
have been particularly illuminating. There is only one aspect to the story pertinent to the history of the application
of mathematics that I feel ought to have received more attention. Dijksterhuis is very emphatic about the fact that
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17th-century mathematics this is certainly true. However, would it not have been clear to Huygens that his law was
still fully quantitative and that he just did not have the right techniques to be able to separate the enunciation of the law
from the wave theory? Clearly this construction is very different from, say, the essentially qualitative Cartesian models
of physics. Once the right tools became available in the early 1800s, Etienne Malus had little problem in separating the
law from the wave theory. In short, I still do not really understand why Huygens felt that his wave-theoretic approach
provided an explanation of the nature of light rather than an alternative description of its behavior. If Huygens really
felt that way, it seems to me there is a certain irony in the fact that his Traité was bundled with a treatise in which
Huygens accuses Newton of ignoring any discussion of the cause of gravity in the Principia. It would appear that
there is no fundamental difference between Huygens’ use of the concept of waves and Newton’s introduction of the
concept of force. Both are perfect illustrations of (E.J.) Dijksterhuis’ “mechanization of the world picture.” The only
difference is that Newton was willing to ignore the issue of the ontological status of the concept of force, whereas
Huygens could only conceive of waves as real, tangible entities. But then, some might argue, it is exactly these kinds
of differences that made Newton a giant and Huygens merely great.
While I have little to comment on the actual contents of the book, I have a major quibble with the presentation of
the material and I am not sure whether the author or the publisher should be blamed. The book was clearly published
from a camera-ready manuscript and the text is riddled with typos, grammatical mistakes, and unusual (sometimes
unfortunate) expressions—with most of the latter clearly recognizable as “Dutchisms.” Overall, the author’s English is
perfectly understandable, but the book really could have used an editor. For what Kluwer charges for its publications
($109 for this one), you would think that the company could afford to hire one. Any reasonably well-educated native
English speaker could have easily spared the author the embarrassment of publishing a book that occasionally reads
like a policy memo put out by the European Union!
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Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) is arguably the most important philosopher of mathematics to have had almost no
influence in his own lifetime. He was prevented by the Bohemian authorities from publishing within the Hapsburg
Empire between 1821 and 1835 on the grounds that his views were too liberal. The articles of his that were published
before the ban were for the most part obscure even when they addressed questions of self-evident importance, and
the later works, often unpublished in his lifetime, are often more philosophical and in their own ways obscure. This
double obscurity was briefly lifted by some German writers in the middle of the 19th century, and he later became
an important figure for the group around Brentano, but by then his strictly mathematical achievements had become
mainstream through the work of others, and he seemed set to become a major footnote. His philosophy of mathematics
was acute, however, and it is the rare combination of philosophical sharpness and genuine mathematics that, however
precariously, contributes to the growing interest in, and appreciation of, his work. Husserl is quoted here on p. 1
declaring him one of the greatest logicians of all time, and he is almost the hero of Coffa’s The Semantic Tradition
from Kant to Carnap [Coffa, 1991].
English readers have been particularly poorly served by Bolzano scholarship, which now plans to produce an
intimidating Bernard Bolzano Gesamtausgabe of 120 volumes in German; those already published are surely not well
